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For some time now, there has been debate in academic circles about just how much civilian politicians in Latin America need to know, and 
do, to control their militaries. David Pion-Berlin, a highly regarded scholar 
on Latin American civil-military relations, has argued that “civilians do not 
have to worry about investing the necessary time to understanding defense, 
strategy, tactics, preparation, budgeting, deployment, doctrine, or train-
ing.”1 Pion-Berlin bases his argument on deductive logic and history, but 
we believe the situation has changed significantly in the region. Therefore, 
we respectfully disagree. in our opinion, civilians must know enough to be 
able to ensure that the armed forces are doing what they are required to do, 
not only in terms of submitting to civilian control, but also in successfully 
fulfilling the current very wide spectrum of roles and missions assigned to 
security forces in Latin America. Unlike Pion-Berlin, we believe that the 
security threats facing Latin America are now so broad and so critical that 
civilians have little choice but to engage with them and invest political 
capital in responding to them. 
We must first recognize that in agreement with Pion-Berlin there is, in 
fact, an important disincentive for civilians to become expert on military 
issues.2 in Aesop’s fable about the hedgehog and the fox, “the fox knows 
many things, but the hedgehog knows one big thing. this suggests that the 
fox, for all of his cunning, is defeated by the hedgehog’s defense.”3 Like 
foxes, democratically elected politicians must know many things, while the 
armed forces, like the hedgehog, only have to know one big thing: national 
security—even though the definition of this concept is in transition. Mili-
tary officers spend their careers studying and training in it; they belong to 
institutions that focus on it; and they ascend through the ranks depending on 
their knowledge of it. it is impossible for civilians, lacking this background, 
to develop anything like the national security expertise of military officers. 
we have seen senior military leaders use a hedgehog strategy to challenge 
civilian control of the military precisely because of the dearth of civilian 
knowledge about national security issues. 
we believe that civilians do not need to be experts on national security 
to exercise control over the military and determine its roles and missions. 
However, they clearly must know something, and just as important, they 
must be aware of what they don’t know. in Latin America, and particularly 
in Central America, security is being reformed to mean much more than 
“national” security: it is widely understood to include “public” and “citizen” 
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PHOTO: Mexican army soldiers guard 
the narcotics police office 16 January 
2003 in Tapachula, Chiapas, Mexico. 
The Mexican army has taken over 
narcotics police offices in 11 states 
as part of a massive drive targeting 
hundreds of corrupt agents and police 
officers, officials said.  Mexican Presi-
dent Vicente Fox said the move sends 
a warning to every federal agent “going 
around with dirty hands, that sooner or 
later we will catch him.” (aFP)
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security as well. while civilians might not need to 
know everything about national security, they must 
know about public and citizen security, and they 
must be ready to act in response to the demands 
of society regarding both. national security has 
meant defending the continuity and sovereignty of a 
state. this is the traditional role of national defense 
forces. Public security refers to the state’s ability 
to maintain public order so that basic sectors such 
as transport, communications, and commerce can 
function. Citizen security addresses the exercise of 
human, political, and social rights by individuals 
and groups in a democracy.
the combination of threats in contemporary 
Central America is so serious that it challenges all 
three levels of security. Civilian elites currently 
employ the armed forces, among other instruments, 
to respond to these challenges. Public opinion 
surveys reveal that insecurity is the first concern 
of citizens in Central America. Our interviews 
indicate that political campaigns hinge on it, and 
that politicians expect to be held accountable for 
it. even the academic literature is catching up to 
this fact of life.4
A Spectrum of Missions
Before turning to these threats, it might be useful 
to examine a national security mission that some 
countries view as an opportunity: peacekeeping and 
peacemaking, collectively termed Peace support 
operations (Pso). these operations are integral to 
the region’s armed forces. in response to Argentine 
President menem’s strategy to change the interna-
tional image of his nation, the military began by 
participating in PSO. More recently, Brazil, Chile, 
and Guatemala sent troops to Haiti for United 
nations Chapter 7 peacemaking operations. Chile, 
like Argentina, has established a Pso training 
center, and el salvador and Guatemala are doing 
so as well. el salvador also sent troops to support 
the U.s.-led coalition in iraq. 
All scholars who write on PSO emphasize the 
critical civil-military component of these opera-
tions, not only at policymaking levels, where the 
ministries of foreign affairs and finance work 
closely with the ministries of defense, but also 
locally, where troops interact with governmental 
and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).5 
there is, in short, a new element to civil-military 
relations in Latin America. increasing numbers of 
countries are involved in what unfortunately prom-
ises to be the growth industry of Pso. there should 
be no doubt in anyone’s mind that civilian policy-
makers are sending troops to Haiti. in Argentina, 
Brazil, and Chile, civilians were actively engaged 
in all phases of the decisions to send troops to Haiti 
and to keep them there.6
Organized crime is another threat keeping the 
region’s militaries employed. many Latin and 
Central American countries face extremely seri-
ous crime problems that threaten the quality of 
life of millions of people and potentially even 
the survival of democracies. Organized crime 
threatens public and citizen security and, in some 
cases, national security as well. Organized crime 
and money-laundering in the tri-Border region 
(Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay), drug-lord con-
trol of Rio de Janeiro favelas, organized crime and 
narcoterrorism in Colombia, and drug shipments 
throughout the region have been enormously cor-
rosive. there is also the newer phenomenon of the 
maras, or gangs, in Central America and mexico. 
Conservative estimates by el salvador’s national 
Police have put the mara membership in Central 
America at approximately 70,000, with 36,000 
in Honduras, 14,000 in Guatemala, 11,000 in 
el salvador, 4,500 in nicaragua, 2,700 in Costa 
Rica, 1,400 in Panama, and 100 in Belize. The 
maras are not only a Central American regional 
phenomenon; in fact, they are transnational. The 
ms-13 gang, for example, reportedly has 8,000 
to 10,000 members in the United states, 4,000 
members in Canada, and a presence in 25 states 
in mexico.7
The maras’ defining characteristic is their excep-
tionally violent behavior. initiation into the gangs, 
…civilians do not need to be 
experts on national security 
to exercise control over the 
military and determine its 
roles and missions. 
However, they clearly must 
know something…
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discipline, and ascension into 
leadership positions are based 
on violence. in ms-13, four 
members beat each prospective 
gang member for 13 seconds 
while he puts up no resistance, 
protecting only his face and 
genitals. Later, mara members 
have to kill a person for no 
other reason than to show they 
can. the maras are believed to 
be responsible for 60 percent 
of the 2,576 murders commit-
ted in el salvador in 2004, and 
the percentage is increasing. 
Countries with maras have 
overtaken even Colombia, with 
its active insurgency, in homi-
cides. in 2005, the number of 
homicides per 100,000 people 
was 54.71 (3,761 homicides) in 
el salvador, 40.66 (2,836) in 
Honduras, 37.53 (5,500) in Guatemala, and 33.76 
(14,503) in Colombia.8
Besides fighting criminal gangs, Latin and Cen-
tral American countries are also becoming increas-
ingly involved in counterterrorism. none of the 
region’s countries except Colombia was concerned 
with terrorist threats before 11 september 2001, 
but since then washington has made eliminating 
these threats priority number one in international 
relations. As General Bantz Craddock states in 
“soUtHCom Priorities and investment Guid-
ance: war on terrorism,” “the  number one prior-
ity for this command is to prevent terrorist groups 
from using the soUtHCom Aor as a staging 
ground to conduct terrorist operations against the 
United states or our vital interests in the western 
Hemisphere, including partner nations throughout 
the region.”9 those partner nations have been urged 
to strengthen their counterterrorist capabilities and 
to cooperate and coordinate with each other and 
the United states. these are civil-military issues 
because top civilian and military leaders decide 
when to use intelligence and special operations 
forces against terrorists. 
Appreciation of the terrorist threat and action 
taken against it varies by countries in the region. 
We find that the governments of some countries that 
did not take the threat seriously, such as Brazil and 
Uruguay, are now developing strategies and com-
mitting resources to fight terrorism. El Salvador has 
received threats because of its role in iraq and has 
responded to the threats. 
it should be obvious from this short summary 
that civilians must be knowledgeable and engaged 
in order to manage the scarce funds, personnel, 
and equipment available to handle Psos, maras, 
and terrorism effectively.10 they really have no 
choice. they must become involved in Psos if 
they want other nations to take them seriously; they 
must fight the maras if they do not want criminals 
to take over their cities; and they must develop 
effective intelligence if they want to prevent ter-
rorists from using their countries to stage attacks 
on the United states. they have to act. How well 
they act, and how well informed they must be, is 
now the real issue. 
nobody can expect civilian foxes to become 
hedgehogs and know everything about the “one 
big thing” that military officers spend their careers 
studying. However, civilian awareness and engage-
ment must extend beyond the ministries of defense 
and the armed forces to include intelligence agen-
cies and ministries of gobernacion, where the police 
are normally located. 
Members of the gang “Mara 18” are arrested during a joint operation by the 
National Civil Police and the Army in the Guatemalan district of Mixco, south of 
the capital, 21 September 2005. 
a
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Controlling the Military 
According to Pion-Berlin, “Latin America is 
not a region where politicians have ever had or 
will ever have the incentive to get up to speed 
on defense issues” in terms either of resources 
or employment.11 these civilians lack incentive 
because Latin America, historically, has been free 
of the kinds of wars that might require civilians to 
know about those issues. even today’s “internal 
threats (narcotraffickers, terrorists, guerrillas) do 
not pose challenges that warrant great military pre-
paredness and sophistication.”12 Pion-Berlin goes 
on to highlight the contrast in competence between 
civilians and military officers by pointing out that 
“with defense perceived to be off limits, civilians 
have never been able to prove their worth. instead, 
they have developed a kind of inferiority complex 
that just reinforces their dependency on the mili-
tary.”13 the lack of civilian expertise isn’t such a 
big problem, however, because “during the past two 
decades, while the balance of competence still tilts 
heavily in favor of the military, the balance of power 
has moved in favor of civilians.”14 Civilians must 
manage the military because it is both the coercive 
arm of the state and a self-interested institution 
whose needs must be addressed. they have done so 
“largely through a form of political civilian control, 
which is a low cost means of achieving a relative 
calm in civil-military affairs without investing in 
extensive institution building, expertise, legisla-
tive oversight, and large budgets.”15 And finally, 
“while civilians interface, they do not intervene. 
the government stays out of the military’s defense 
sphere of influence principally because of its lack 
of knowledge and staff.”16 
Latin America might be a “zone of peace” with 
regard to external conflict, but it is not peaceful 
internally, as the maras, drug traffickers, organized 
crime, and insurgencies (in Colombia) illustrate. 
Currently, civilian policymakers in mexico and 
Central America have put the armed forces either 
on the frontline against criminal gangs or in sup-
port of anti-crime efforts. Civilian leaders also have 
directed the military to fulfill international respon-
sibilities short of war, as the Pso support of Argen-
tina, Brazil, Chile, El Salvador, Guatemala, and 
other Latin American countries shows. Although 
such missions are not directly related to national 
defense, they employ the armed forces (and to a 
lesser degree police forces) in support of perceived 
national interests. For example, Brazilian generals 
head up the UN Mission in Haiti, and a Brazilian 
brigade of 967 soldiers is deployed there.17
Civilian policymakers not only manage the armed 
forces, but also decide upon its roles and missions, 
whether they want to or not, and whether they are 
well informed or not. these are empirical facts: 
presidents and their appointees decide on a daily 
basis about the use of security forces, including 
the armed forces. Analysts can agree or disagree 
with the wisdom of the decision, but in 2004, Gua-
temalan President oscar Berger decided to reduce 
military manpower and budget by 50 percent. He 
accomplished that in about 90 days. Civilian policy-
makers don’t need to know the “one big thing,” but 
it seems to us that they do need to establish institu-
tions to embody and perpetuate the knowledge and 
expertise needed to deal with military missions as 
they arise. only in this way can democratic govern-
ments routinely deal with problems and crises in an 
internationally acceptable manner. 
The Trinity
Based on our work for over a decade in more 
than 100 countries in all parts of the world, and 
drawing from the literature on security and civil-
military relations, we see civil-military relations as 
a trinity. The first part of the trinity is “democratic 
civilian control of the armed forces.” this is a 
fairly simple concept, concerns power, and must be 
implemented through institutions such as ministries 
of defense, oversight committees in the congress, 
civilian control of officer promotions and military 
education, and the like. the other two elements of 
the trinity are “effectiveness” and “efficiency.” By 
effectiveness, we mean that the armed services and 
other security forces successfully implement the 
roles and missions assigned to them by democrati-
cally elected civilians. Efficiency means that they 
accomplish their missions at the least possible cost 
…we see civil-military relations 
as a trinity. The first part of the 
trinity is democratic civilian 
control of the armed forces.
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in lives and resources. Because there are no simple 
mathematical formulae that define least possible 
costs, countries must have civilian institutions in 
place to determine priorities for assigning resources. 
Civilian policymakers—the foxes—need to think 
beyond problems of control and consider whether 
their forces can achieve their assigned roles and 
missions, and if so, at what cost and at what level 
of risk. Control does not imply effectiveness and 
efficiency. Indeed, the simplest way to control the 
armed forces would be to eliminate them, as in 
Costa rica and Panama, or to severely constrain 
their budgets, as in ecuador. neither leads to effec-
tiveness or efficiency.18
Institutions
If we analyze how different countries deal with 
elements of the trinity, we can identify four sets of 
structures and processes that we call “institutions” 
to emphasize their empirical nature.19 table 1 illus-
trates how these four institutions support the trinity 
of civil-military relations.
Ministries of defense (MOD). moDs can sup-
port all three elements of the trinity.20 Civilian 
policymakers can control the armed forces through 
a moD. the moD also typically evaluates the 
effectiveness of military roles and missions while 
cadres of civilian and military lawyers, economists, 
and accountants within the moD measure how 
efficiently resources are used. 
Legislatures. these institutions support all three 
elements of the trinity. they ensure democratic 
civilian control by maintaining the separation of 
powers, controlling the budget, and exercising 
oversight. Diversity of political representation 
(through elections) and the development of exper-
tise among members and particularly their staffs 
allow legislatures to improve the effectiveness of 
military roles and missions. Furthermore, legis-
latures ensure efficiency by routinely exercising 
an oversight function through hearings, auditing 
units, and inspectors general. in most of the older 
democracies, legislatures enhance efficiency more 
than effectiveness.21
Interagency communication and cooperation 
mechanism. whether it occurs via a national secu-
rity council or another executive-level organization 
such as Brazil’s Institutional Security Cabinet, the 
government must have a way to effect interagency 
communication and cooperation—such a mecha-
nism is critical for effectiveness. the interagency 
process is an element of democratic civilian con-
trol, but it depends on institutions such as an moD 
to influence effectiveness. With an interagency 
process, civilian leaders can determine roles and 
missions in a rational manner. moreover, because 
security today spans a wide spectrum of possibili-
ties, this interagency process or mechanism must 
be robust. 
Intelligence system. this system supports the 
first two elements of the trinity. Contemporary 
democracies maintain elaborate military and 
civilian intelligence systems and even more elabo-
rate mechanisms to control them. there is also 
much emphasis today on effective intelligence. 
However, although executive and legislative 
institutions scrutinize intelligence systems, there 
is often no real effort to monitor their efficiency. 
the emphasis on secrecy in intelligence collec-








Control X X X







El Salvador X X X
Guatemala X
Status: El Salvador and 
Guatemala 
Having laid out the four “institutions” used to 
support the trinity of civil-military relations, we 
Table 2. Institutional bases for trinity in  
two countries.
Table 1. Institutional bases for trinity of democratic 
civil-military relations.
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think it would be informative to see just how effec-
tive two of the region’s countries, el salvador and 
Guatemala, have been at implementing civilian 
control of the military.
El Salvador. As table 2 indicates, el salvador 
has made tremendous progress in recent years.23 
Although an active-duty general still heads the 
moD and few high-level civilians work in the 
ministry, there have been major reforms in other 
areas. About ten members of the 84-member con-
gress are knowledgeable about security issues and 
have informed, competent staffs. A national security 
council has been active since the mid-1990s, and a 
secretariat with six permanent, full-time members 
has provided continuity and support to the council 
since 2005. el salvador’s intelligence system is 
robust and highly professional. it includes a presi-
dential intelligence agency, military intelligence, 
and a police intelligence component. 
Guatemala. in Guatemala, everything is “on 
the verge” of happening—but it has been that way 
for many years.24 the Guate-
malan constitution requires 
the minister of defense to 
be an active-duty general 
officer. In the last few years, 
the minister has assumed a 
bigger role and more power 
than the chief of the general 
staff of the armed forces (as 
one might expect given the 
fact that the last three min-
isters had previously served 
as chief). The ministry has a half-dozen qualified 
civilian members, mainly in the areas of defense 
policy and legal affairs, and plans to have a civil-
ian vice minister of defense if the constitution 
cannot be changed to allow a civilian to run the 
moD. the Guatemalan congress requires annual 
turnover of the heads of committees; consequently, 
nobody develops any expertise, a drawback that 
is aggravated when the committee staffs change 
as well. while Guatemala’s president does have 
periodic cabinet meetings with the ministers of 
defense, gobernacion, and foreign affairs, there is 
no permanent or technical staff to support those 
meetings and effect any resolutions issuing from 
them (although there is a written plan for a national 
security system that is “on the verge” of imple-
mentation). Guatemalans and their foreign allies 
have focused much attention on intelligence since 
at least 1997, but there is only nominal oversight 
of it from the executive branch and none from the 
congress. 
Explaining the variations. to account for the 
differences between el salvador and Guatemala 
in civil-military relations, we must look first at the 
terms and conditions of each country’s post-civil 
war transition to democracy and the prerogatives 
accruing to each country’s armed forces.25 
First, we note that in 1992 el salvador’s military 
developed “Plan Arce 2000,” which they have been 
implementing ever since. now “Plan Arce 2005,” 
it reformed the armed forces and provided a new, 
democratic approach to civil-military relations. in 
Guatemala, the military initiated the transition from 
a military to a civilian regime, and it continued to 
support that change along with the peace process; 
however, to the best of our knowledge, that was the 
end of their plan, and the end of their influence. 26 
second, international 
involvement and influence 
has been extremely impor-
tant in el salvador, but much 
less so in Guatemala, where 
foreign engagement in the 
peace process was less cen-
tral. Of course, foreign influ-
ence can work only if there 
is some way for outsiders to 
engage with domestic con-
stituencies.27 Unfortunately, 
the region has no organization, like NATO or the 
european Union, that can set forth detailed rules for, 
among other things, democratic civil-military rela-
tions as prerequisites for membership. the United 
States has at least partially filled that vacuum, but 
while it has been willing to continue a high level 
of security assistance for el salvador because of 
its continued participation in iraq, it has not done 
so for Guatemala because of the latter’s record of 
human rights abuses and its difficulty in working 
with other governments.28  Guatemala’s transition 
has also been impeded by (in our view) the overly 
influential role single-issue NGOs have played in 
determining U.s. policy toward the country. 
third, at least in countries that were formerly 
under military control, the government can only 
…the government can 
only address issues in 
civil-military relations  
when it is stable and  
coherent enough  
to govern. 
73Military review  September-October 2006
C I V I L I A N  C O N T R O L  O F  T H E  M I L I TA R Y
address issues in civil-military relations when 
it is stable and coherent enough to govern. the 
“deal” in el salvador held, and yielded a rela-
tively stable political system that included the 
rebel Farabundo martí national Liberation Front. 
the deal in Guatemala failed on the civilian side. 
President Alfonso Antonio Portillo Cabrera, who 
had come to power promising to fight corruption 
and defend Guatemala’s poor and indigenous 
majority, had to flee to Mexico in 2004 to avoid 
corruption charges. 
The fourth and final point concerns political 
learning. scholars know that political and orga-
nizational learning is important. It is, however, a 
very difficult indicator to assess.29 At a minimum, 
we envision leaders learning about civil-military 
relations in moDs, educational institutions, and 
think tanks. in el salvador, the Plan Arce 2000 
created the Command for Doctrine and military 
Education, which institutionalized learning for 
all branches of the armed forces in 18 educational 
institutions, including the College for Higher stra-
tegic studies, a school with an impressive 15-year 
record of educating civilians and officers to work 
together in the executive and legislative branches 
of government.30 in short, there are multiple areas 
for political learning in el salvador, including a 
myriad of foreign-funded nGos and think tanks 
that provide funding for academics and activists. 
in Guatemala, reality has finally intervened, 
and much is changing. in our interviews there last 
march, including a meeting with President Berger 
and his security cabinet, we learned that he and 
his government perceive serious security threats 
at all levels—national, public, and citizen—and 
are planning on implementing changes that will 
institutionalize the interagency process and the 
intelligence system. 
there are at least three reasons for these potential 
changes: the U.s., British, and Colombian Gov-
ernments are encouraging and supporting change; 
under Berger, the government is stable; and NGOs 
and a defense community founded in 2001 have 
accumulated a critical mass of knowledge and 
access. if these trends continue, Guatemala might 
catch up to el salvador in civil-military relations 
and the institutions necessary to institutionalize 
them. if it does, it should begin to respond more 
effectively to the multiple security challenges facing 
the country and the region. MR 
Salvadoran President Elias Antonio Saca, center, and Defense Minister Otto Romero, left, review troops of the Artillery 
Brigade in San Juan Opico, El Salvador, 11 August 2006 during the farewell ceremony for the VII Cuscatlán Battalion 
before their deployment to Iraq as part of a multinational force working in humanitarian operations.  
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NOTES
Dogs and soldiers keep off  the grass!
So the hoary motto is passed
From generation to generation,
Of  the enlightened class;
About my brothers, some in the present,
And some in the past.
Baby killer, knave, drunkard, coward!
We don’t need any military power!
So the enlightened ones shout and glower.
Make love not war!
The only thing that makes us sore, 
Are soldiers and sailors defending our shore!
Peace at any price! they happily rant.
Freedom, oh Freedom! they cheerfully chant.
They don’t ken freedom isn’t free.
And the cost of  that freedom is a very high fee.
Too high to be paid by their peace loving souls,
They call on soldiers to pay the whole toll.
Men of  honor and integrity still pay the blood fee,
Through service and sacrifice keeping us free. 
So chant the chants and rant the rants! 
But don’t try and kick me in the pants!
Dogs and soldiers keep off  the grass?
They can just kiss my “G.I.” brass.
Dogs and Soldiers
 
 —MSG  (Retired) Chuck Doig
